Friday, April 20, 2012

Jilap records 190 deaths by firearms in Port-au-Prince area from January to March 2012.

Haïti-Sécurité : Cent quatre-vingt dix tués par balles, de janvier à mars 2012, selon Jilap

jeudi 19 avril 2012


(Read the original article here)

P-au-P, 19 avril 2012 [AlterPresse] --- La commission épiscopale nationale justice et paix (sigle créole Jilap) enregistre au total 190 décès par balles de Janvier à Mars 2012 dans son 42e rapport sur la violence dans la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince, publié en avril 2012.

La commission dit observer une légère diminution des cas de morts par balles au cours de ce trimestre (janvier à mars 2012), comparé au trimestre précédent (octobre à décembre 2011) au cours duquel 203 morts par balles ont été enregistrés.

Le nombre de décès par balles a connu une légère baisse au mois de janvier 2012 (41 cas), pour remonter en force en février et mars, respectivement 78 et 71 cas, indique le document.

Précédemment, en octobre, novembre et décembre 2011, le nombre s’élevait respectivement à 62, 77, 64 morts par balles.

Selon la commission, la plupart des personnes sont victimes de la violence armée dans la capitale. D’autres formes de violence répandues sont les braquages, holdups et vols à main armée, souligne le rapport de Jilap.

Les crimes commis à partir de motocyclettes atteignent un record au mois de février 2012 avec 16 cas contre 4 en janvier et 12 en mars, selon les chiffres fournis.

Quatre policiers sont assassinés au cours du dernier trimestre, contre 6 pour le trimestre précédent.

Dans le rapport, Jilap signale un ensemble d’actes de violence commis sur plusieurs individus dont l’assassinat du directeur de radio Boukman, Nelson Jean Liphaite, et celui du peintre Burton Chenet.

Jilap dit constater que les déclarations et promesses des autorités sur la situation d’insécurité qui prévaut dans la zone métropolitaine n’aboutissent pas à un redressement de la situation.

« Définir une politique de sécurité est et demeure l’œuvre de l’Etat et doit s’articuler à travers une volonté d’agir pour le bien être de la population », fait savoir Jilap.

L’organisme de droits humains estime que la prévention en matière de sécurité de façon permanente, les poursuites en justice des bandits ainsi que les enquêtes ne se réalisent pas.

Ceci démontre le degré d’impunité dont jouissent des malfaiteurs laissant le champ libre à n’importe quelle initiative criminelle qui peut être perpétrée en toute quiétude, indique t-il.

« La lutte pour instaurer un climat de sécurité nécessite justice et vérité dans les tribunaux, en plus, il faut un climat de justice sociale entre les citoyens et citoyennes », soutient la commission.

Jilap préconise « la création d’un cadre sécuritaire pour les petits marchands, leur permettant d’avoir une assurance sociale les protégeant contre des actes de banditisme et des accidents comme des incendies ».

Des travaux d’entretien, la mise en application de règlements du trafic routier, un contrôle plus strict sur la vente des cartes de téléphone cellulaire, la réparation des pylônes électriques en mauvais état sont des mesures pouvant assurer plus de sécurité dans la zone métropolitaine, croit Jilap.

Face au grand nombre de morts par balles, la Commission insiste sur un contrôle effectif et efficace de la circulation et du port d’armes à feu dans le pays. [emb kft gp apr 18/04/2012 16 :20]

Monday, March 26, 2012

Aristide accused of taking bribes from Miami businesses

4 March 2012

Aristide accused of taking bribes from Miami businesses

By Jacqueline Charles and Jay Weaver, The Miami Herald

(Read the original article here)

Former Haiti President Jean-Bertrand Aristide is once again in the crosshairs of the U.S. government, this time for allegedly pocketing millions of dollars in bribes from Miami businesses that brokered long-distance phone deals with Haiti's government-owned telecommunications company, according to court records and legal sources.

Aristide is not identified by name in a recent federal indictment charging four South Florida business people and two former Haitian government officials. But defense attorneys say "Official B" referenced in the corruption- and money-laundering indictment is indeed the ex-president.

According to the indictment, Official B and senior officials of Haiti Teleco, the telecommunications company owned by Haiti's Central Bank, allegedly received payments totaling about $2.3 million from Miami businesses Cinergy Telecommunications and Uniplex Telecom Technologies. The businesses are accused of using "shell" companies to kick back the money to those officials.

Aristide's lawyer, Ira Kurzban, declined to comment about the Justice Department's investigation because the ex-president hasn't been charged with any crime. But, Kurzban said: "I view this as part of the same smear campaign that the United States has orchestrated against Aristide since he was first elected in 1990."

The indictment alleges that the bribes were passed to Aristide via "Company A," a reference to Digitek, a suspected front owned by Aristide's brother-in-law, Lesly Lavelanet. He could not be reached for comment at his Coral Springs home.

Since an earlier related indictment was returned by a federal grand jury in 2009, a dozen South Florida business people and Haitian officials have been charged in the high-profile case, alleging the payment of kickbacks in exchange for discounted long-distance phone rates. Profits from those lower rates were pocketed by the Haitian officials — not the government's phone company. So far, seven of those defendants have been convicted of corruption or money laundering, including Patrick Joseph, who pleaded guilty in February to accepting bribes. Joseph is cooperating with Justice Department lawyers and is a crucial witness in the investigation of Aristide, according to sources familiar with the case.

Joseph, who served as Aristide's director general of Haiti Teleco in March 2001 to June 2003, has told U.S. authorities that he shared some of those kickbacks with the former president, the sources said.

Joseph's father, Venel Joseph, appointed by Aristide, was the governor of the Bank of Haiti, the central bank, during that period and is referenced in the indictment as "Official A.''

The Central Bank was used to distribute the kickbacks paid by the Miami businesses, the indictment says.

Patrick Joseph's Miami attorneys, Guy Lewis and Richard Dansoh, declined to comment. Justice Department officials also would not comment.

At Joseph's plea hearing last month, a prosecutor said "half" — or $1 million — of the alleged kickbacks were "intended" for "Official B, an official in the executive branch of the Haitian government."

"In exchange for these bribes, Official B and Joseph provided Uniplex and Cinergy with various business advantages, including an exclusive agreement to market certain calling cards at a favorable rate,"

Justice Department lawyer James Koukios said in court.

"In addition, Joseph was aware of and agreed that additional bribe payments to Official B would be laundered through Company A," Koukios said, without mentioning Digitek by name.

The revelation that federal officials are still pursuing Aristide, years after a U.S. grand jury investigation failed to nab him on drug-trafficking and money-laundering allegations, comes at a politically charged time in Haiti.

Haitian media reported last week that President Michel Martelly's government had indicted Aristide for corruption and drug trafficking during his rule, immediately triggering anger among his supporters.

Haiti's justice minister told The Miami Herald the reports were false.

Still, thousands marched through the streets of Haiti's capital Wednesday, singing pro-Aristide slogans while bashing Martelly, to mark the eighth anniversary of Aristide's ouster from power on Feb.29, 2004.

The demonstration — the biggest anti-Martelly protest since he came to power in May — showed that Aristide still enjoys a measure of popularity. He returned to Haiti from South Africa last March over the strong objections of the Obama administration.

Before it was privatized last year at the behest of the U.S. government, Haiti Teleco was a corruption-plagued, money-losing company that fueled the bank accounts of its executives. Fewer than 2 percent of Haitians had service from its landline monopoly, but it had a lucrative long-distance business. After the January 2010 earthquake, the company finally got a lifeline when a firm named Viettel, run by Vietnam's military, bought a major stake in the entity, reducing Haiti's shares to 40 percent.

The controversy over Haiti Teleco's corrupt past will play out again Monday, when a former senior executive, Jean René Duperval, faces trial on money-laundering charges in Miami federal court as part of the initial indictment. He is accused of receiving bribes from the same Miami businesses.

The trial of Duperval, Haiti Teleco's former director of international relations, highlights the Justice Department's persistence in pursuing the bribery case and Aristide.

Some question the zeal. But Alex Dupuy, a sociology professor at Wesleyan University who has written about the two-time ex-president, said "if they have solid evidence of his involvement in bribery or other criminal activities, they should indict him and bring him to justice."

The U.S. government may be sending a signal to Aristide, called Titid by his admirers, to think twice about trying to re-enter the political scene, observers said.

"The display of popular support for Aristide is very worrisome to the U.S., so indicting Titid before a potential comeback makes perfect sense," said Robert Fatton, a Haiti expert at the University of Virginia.

Still, unless the Justice Department has an air-tight case, arresting Aristide could have volatile consequences, observers said.

Corruption and drug-trafficking charges have long dogged Aristide.

Haiti's interim government produced four blistering reports from two government investigative commissions, alleging he had embezzled more than $20 million of his country's meager public funds.

But the Haitian government's financial watchdog agency could not prove the allegations. Also, a civil lawsuit filed in Miami by the interim government, gained no traction.

Meanwhile, federal prosecutors investigated Aristide for allegedly accepting bribes from drug traffickers. But they could not make their case because of a lack of financial documents to back up convicted cocaine kingpin Jacques Ketant's accusations, according to sources familiar with that probe.

Now, the mere mention of Aristide as Official B in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act indictment filed by the Justice Department in January marks the first time he has been implicated in the U.S. bribery investigation into Haiti's state-owned telecommunications company.

From 2001 to 2004, "Official B was an official in the executive branch of the Haitian government," says the indictment, describing the exact period of Aristide's second term as president."I am led to believe that Official B is the former president of Haiti, Aristide," said veteran Miami criminal defense attorney Joel Hirschhorn, who represents Cinergy and two of its executives in the case.

"There is no doubt that Official B is Aristide based on the language in the indictment," said Miami lawyer David Weinstein, who was the chief of narcotics in the U.S. Attorney's Office during the past decade. He and other prosecutors won convictions against several Haitian government and police officials for accepting payoffs from drug traffickers, who used the country to ship cocaine to the United States.

But Weinstein cautioned that the Justice Department will face daunting challenges in making a money-laundering case against Aristide, even if the cooperating witness, Joseph, points investigators in the right direction.

There is a looming deadline in the probe because of the statute of limitations. Also crucial: Internal Revenue Service agents must find bank or financial records to show that Aristide received payments, if he did.

"Without someone producing a picture of him taking the money or agents uncovering a bank account directly linking him to payments, they are going to have a hard time building a case to win a conviction,"

Weinstein said.

Last week, Hirschhorn succeeded in getting Cinergy dismissed as a defendant before Monday's trial.

"My clients' dealings with Haiti Teleco were perfectly legitimate,"

said Hirschhorn, who added that Cinergy's top executives, now fugitives in Brazil, only met Aristide once for a brief moment. "They helped Haiti Teleco get through some very difficult and trying times."

Sunday, March 18, 2012

Note de Presse de LFHH relative la Déclaration de Montrouis

Note de Presse de LFHH relative la Déclaration de Montrouis

Port-au-Prince, Haïti, le 15 mars 2012. -- La Fondation Héritage pour Haïti (LFHH) salue l’engagement pris par un groupe de 31 Parlementaires (Sénateurs et Députés de la 49ème Législature) pour enclencher le processus législatif devant aboutir à l’adoption de la Loi sur la prévention et la répression de la corruption à la clôture de la retraite parlementaire organisée à Montrouis du 9 au 11 mars 2012 par l’Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption (ULCC).

LFHH rappelle que le projet de loi sur la prévention et la répression de la corruption a été adopté par le gouvernement haïtien en date du 30 décembre 2009 et soumis à la sanction du parlement. L’adoption de ce projet de loi vise à renforcer la lutte contre la corruption en Haïti.

LFHH encourage les parlementaires à accélérer le processus législatif en vue de le conduire au vote de ladite loi par les deux branches du Parlement. Cette initiative rentre dans le cadre de la stratégie nationale de lutte contre la corruption adoptée par le gouvernement de la République en date du 16 mars 2009 et permettra à Haïti d’harmoniser sa législation avec les prescrits de la Convention des Nations Unies Contre la Corruption (CNUCC) et de combattre l’impunité en matière de corruption.

LFHH exhorte l’Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption (ULCC), à poursuivre son plaidoyer auprès des parlementaires en vue de les sensibiliser sur l’importance du vote dudit projet de loi dans le meilleur délai. La Déclaration de Montrouis signée par 31 Sénateurs et Députés présents à la retraite parlementaire du 9 au 11 mars 2012 constitue un pas significatif dans la bonne direction.

En voici un extrait :

« Nous, Sénateurs et Députés de la 49ème Législature, ayant participé à la retraite parlementaire organisée du 9 au 11 mars 2012 sur le projet de loi portant prévention et répression de la corruption, nous engageons à enclencher le processus législatif et le conduire à son terme en adoptant une législation appropriée pour renforcer la lutte contre la corruption en Haïti. Fait à Moulin-sur- Mer, Montrouis, le dimanche 11 mars 2012. »


A propos de Transparency International (TI) :

Transparency International (TI), la plus grande organisation de la société civile de lutte contre la corruption dans le monde, a été créée en 1993, à l'initiative de Monsieur Peter Eigen et a établi son siège à Berlin. Monsieur Eigen, Président de l’organisation de 1993 à 2005, est de nationalité allemande, juriste, ancien cadre supérieur de la Banque Mondiale, membre du Conseil Consultatif du Centre pour le Développement International de Harvard University et professeur de Sciences Politiques au Freie Universität de Berlin. Elue Présidente durant l’Assemblée annuelle des sections de TI à Berlin en novembre 2005, Madame Huguette Labelle remplace depuis lors Monsieur Eigen à la tête de l’organisation

TI a depuis 1993 catalysé la constitution d’un partenariat de plus de 100 sections nationales, y inclus LFHH, à travers le monde.

La Fondation Héritage pour Haïti (LFHH) en quelques lignes :

Créée en 1998 par un groupe de citoyens haïtiens, La Fondation Héritage pour Haïti (LFHH) est une fondation privée, non partisane, à but non-lucratif. Depuis mai 2003, LFHH est la représentante officielle de Transparency International (TI) en Haïti.

La vision de LFHH est celle-ci : une nation où le gouvernement, la politique, les affaires, la société civile et la vie de la population est libre de corruption et où le comportement intègre, éthique, responsable et discipliné est valorisé par la société.

La mission de LFHH est de combattre la corruption, d’oeuvrer à la promotion des valeurs d’éthique, d’intégrité et de probité dans les sphères publique et privée de la société haïtienne et d’encourager le respect des normes d’une société moral

Thursday, December 22, 2011

Notes on Red and Black in Haiti


Notes on Red and Black in Haiti

By Michael Deibert

Small Axe 36 • November 2011 • Michael Deibert | 157

Red and Black in Haiti: Radicalism, Conflict, and Political Change, 1934–1957

Matthew J. Smith

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,

304 pages

$26.95

I

One of my earliest memories of visiting Haiti in the mid-1990s was a trip I took along with a street-hailed cab down to the area near Port-au-Prince’s waterfront where Haiti’s parliament and the old American embassy were located. Being new to the city, I had nowhere in particular in mind that I wanted to see, save for a general idea of arriving at some point at the Episcopal Cathédrale Sainte Trinité to survey the stunning indigenous Biblical murals painted there by artists such as Wilson Bigaud and Philome Obin decades before.

Strolling away from Haiti’s parliament, the Palais Législatif, under a blazing Caribbean sun, I walked through a wide plaza fluttering with the flags of the member countries of the United Nations, a holdover from the time when Haiti hosted a lavish bicentennial exposition from December 1949 until April 1950 to celebrate the two-hundredth anniversary of the founding of Port-au-Prince.

Beyond the plaza, I came eventually to a grassy bluff facing the Bay of Port-au-Prince. There, its walls and foundations broken, graffitied, and chipped away, its grass trampled, and homeless legions sprawling passed out or lounging all around its circumference, I found the tomb of Dumarsais Estimé, the president who governed Haiti during the time of the exposition.

The derelict, melancholy appearance of the tomb—Estimé’s second resting place since being reinterred here by the dictator François Duvalier in 1968—said much about Haiti’s supposed ongoing state of revolution in the years since Estimé served as Haiti’s president from August 1946 until May 1950. Though we did not know it at the time, after the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide by a US-led multinational military force in 1994 and the inauguration of René Préval as his successor a year and a half later, Haiti was setting up for another one of the violent, chaotic showdowns that have defined its intense political culture for two centuries, this time one that would result in Aristide’s overthrow and exile in 2004.

At that moment in downtown Port-au-Prince, as since, looking at the crypt that held the mortal remains of one of Haiti’s great leaders I was reminded, as I often am when observing politicians, of Percy Bysshe Shelley’s 1818 sonnet Ozymandias, in which the poet tells of observing the ruined statue of a king in the desert, bearing the inscription “Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!,” as “the lone and level sands stretch far away.”

II

Among outsiders unschooled in Haiti’s byzantine political and social legacies, the history of the Caribbean nation often appears to be little more than a handful of moments of hope-tinged tumult punctuated by long stretches of disappointment and ruin.

Haiti’s historic 1804 defeat of Napoleon’s forces and the country’s 1915–1934 US military occupation have been reasonably well covered, as has been the twenty-nine-year family dictatorship of François Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier. The 1990 election of priest-turned-politician Aristide, the coup against him the following year, the military operation to reinstate him, and his subsequent overthrow and exile ten years later are eras that have all fallen under the gaze of foreign observers, who have commented on them with varying degrees of interest and expertise. Aside from these moments, foreign commentators on Haiti rouse themselves only in brief, strobe-light flashes of concentration, with each moment of focus treated as if it was a unique and singular event in what has in fact been a tortuously entwined history.

To those who travel the length and breadth of Haiti, chatting with its people in Kreyol in the back of sweltering tap-taps and in its hardscrabble peasant fields, one quickly realizes that the events that occurred during the long interims between these dramatic moments have also played a key role in determining the country’s history, perhaps even more so that the more-familiar moments. It was during these interims, we find, that the seeds of later events were first planted. Haitian historians such as the late Roger Gaillard have long known this, but it is a salient fact of Haiti’s political history that seems to have escaped many foreign commentators on the country.

This is why, with Red and Black in Haiti: Radicalism, Conflict, and Political Change, 1934–1957, the young Jamaican historian Matthew J. Smith brings a welcome new aspect to much of the recent writing on Haiti: genuine scholarship. [1] Covering a pivotal and heretofore largely ignored two decade period in the nation’s development with a wealth of primary sources, Smith’s book shows us, with great import, that the struggle throughout Haitian history to form something resembling a responsive and decent government for its citizens was not just something debated in the realm of a series maximum leaders, but the heritage of a collective struggle made up of actors from different strata of Haitian society, the complex intermingling of which Smith does an admirable job of trying to disentangle.

In a small, poor country where few people can speak or write English proficiently, foreign observers of both the left and the right seem to feel that they have found the perfect canvas on which to outline their own theories and agendas, no matter how little time they have spent in Haiti or how irrelevant their theories may be to the struggles of Haitians as a whole. Academics with political agendas as diverse as Lawrence Harrison and Peter Hallward, callow commentators such as the Center for Economic and Policy Research’s Mark Weisbrot and author Naomi Klein, and fulminating media demagogues such as Rush Limbaugh and Pat Robertson have all been guilty over the years of expounding upon Haiti from a position of ideologically motivated ignorance, and their often dilettantish and disrespectful approach is what makes Smith’s book so valuable: it approaches Haiti as a nation like any other, with a deep and rich history worthy of rigorous analysis as opposed to simple, shrill sloganeering. [2]

Though the 1915–1934 US occupation of Haiti happened for a number of reasons, it is hard to overstate just what a dismal, sanguinary level Haitian politics had sunk to preceding it. In the four years before the invasion, no less than five Haitian presidents had been forced from office either by assassination or by coup d’état. While the occupation succeeded (at the dear price of Haiti’s sovereignty) in somewhat bringing the country’s political violence to heel, it did little to address the long-standing tensions and enmities in Haitian society, which briefly receded in the anti-occupation activities of such groups as the Union Patriotique, only to quickly resurfaced once the foreigners had gone away. Smith nevertheless characterizes the post-occupation era then at hand as “Haiti’s greatest moment of political promise. . . . At its outset, black consciousness and an intense cross-class nationalism produced a rare opportunity for lasting political change”.

It was an intellectual and cultural hothouse over which former Port-au-Prince mayor Sténio Vincent, a nationalist who cut his political teeth with the Union Patriotique, presided. Years later, witheringly alluded to by the writer Jacques Stephen Alexis as “an aging Casanova preserved in alcohol,” despite his anti-occupation credentials, Vincent, upon elevation to the presidency, quickly became one of Americans’ closest allies in the region, even as he dissolved Haiti’s legislature in 1935 and ran virtually unopposed in corrupted presidential
elections in May 1935.

Using increasingly thuggish methods in his quest to cling to power, Vincent pushed the political discourse that had been reinvigorated by the occupation to find its outlet in other areas. In exploring the links between Haiti’s cultural development and its political struggles, Smith wisely gives due to a nation that has given the Caribbean arguably its richest intellectual tradition, examining in detail the connections between intellectual and activist discourse in a political landscape that is often reduced by outsiders to mere populism. In one of the many ironies found in Haiti’s history, in the Haiti of the 1930s the appeal of Communism was chiefly to the country’s foreign-educated elite, who returned home determined to try and change what the Haitian writer and diplomat Frédéric Marcelin had in 1904 called the country’s tradition of “civil strife, fratricidal slaughters, social miseries, economic ignorance and idolatrous militarism.”

Jacques Roumain, whose 1943 novel Gouverneurs de la Rosée remains one of the most moving portraits constructed of Haitian peasant life, despite his own bourgeois background became a committed Communist during this time, founding, along with Georges Petit, the Parti communiste haitien (PCH) in 1934 under the slogan “Color is nothing, class is everything.”

Cutting through facile appeals to nationalism characteristic of Haiti’s political class, the PCH’s first national program, L’analyse schematique, dismissed such discourse by concluding that “the arrival to power of the Nationalists [i.e., Vincent] began the process of decomposition of nationalism,” going on to witheringly characterize Haiti’s bourgeois politicians as “valets of imperialism and cruel exploiters of the workers and peasants."

Among the other important historical figures of the Haitian left that Smith rescues from obscurity is Max Hudicourt, a gifted orator and the scion of a well-regarded family from the southern city of Jérémie who could nevertheless move easily among Haiti’s impoverished majority. Jailed with Roumain for his political activity though not a communist himself, Hudicourt would die prematurely under mysterious circumstances from a gunshot wound in 1947. However, in post-occupation Haiti, as the opposition of the largely bourgeois radical left attempted to apply the tenets of global Communism to Haiti’s reality, a handful of black intellectuals were drinking at an altogether different well for inspiration.

Looking to the writer and ethnologist Jean-Price Mars, whose 1928 book Ainsi parla l’oncle was a landmark in the négritude movement in the French-speaking Caribbean, the group referred to themselves as the Griots, after the traditional storytellers of West Africa. Rather than looking to European social-political models to address Haiti’s myriad problems, they instead “demanded a greater incorporation of folk practices, especially vodou, in national life . . . [arguing] that the country’s most basic problem since independence [was] the constant exploitation of the majority of the black inhabitants by a small privileged [mulatto] elite."

Among the Griots' number was a young doctor whom Price-Mars had taught as a student years before named François Duvalier. Arguing that “cultural authenticity defined all other aspects of social life” (ibid.), the Griots concluded that the Europhile outlook made it impossible for mulatto elites such as the Communists to understand the needs of a black country, hence Haiti’s chronic underdevelopment.

In these early years after the occupation, that “greatest moment of political promise” provided outlines of what will become the template of Haiti’s future political dynamic: a ruler with authoritarian tendencies trying to simultaneously bully, corrupt, and seduce opponents into supporting him as he faces a fractured political class made up of left-wing social democrat, right-wing, and populist parties with often negligible levels of public support, while an often avaricious and irresponsible upper class looks on and influences events as best they can when it suits them. Complimenting this situation, then as now, is Haiti’s complicated relationship with the neighboring Dominican Republic, for three decades under the explicitly fascist rule of Rafael Trujillo, and the shifting foreign policies of the United States, which gradually transformed from a Cold War–era doctrine of Communist containment to a neoliberal doctrine of laissez-faire capitalism that did little to stem Haiti’s economic free-fall.

When Vincent was succeeded by Elie Lescot, a consummate political survivor and opportunist, the elite’s grip on the nation’s political and economic mechanisms was thrown into the starkest relief since the end of the occupation. Lescot had served under the occupation-era government of Louis Borno as well as that of Vincent, often in politically sensitive posts such as Minster of the Interior, Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, and Ambassador to the United States, but nevertheless he appears have placed too much faith in the ability of his powerful friends to save what soon became an explicitly colorist dictatorship. In a precursor of other half-baked schemes decades later, the United States sponsored the Société haitiano-américaine de dévelopment agricole (SHADA) in an ill-fated attempted to cultivate rubber in Haiti in an effort that ended up alienating the very peasants it was designed to help.

The overthrow of Lescot—the Revolution of 1946—was an extraordinarily significant moment for Haiti which has thus far received scant attention from foreign scholars writing on the country. Here, Smith presents the time in its full complexity, with important roles played by the Communist left, student groups, and, memorably, French surrealist André Breton in helping to topple a regime. Though Roumain—who had died two years before, at the age of thirty seven—had accepted a minor diplomatic post from Lescot, his writing was nevertheless hugely influential with the young revolutionaries, at the forefront of whom was another one of Haiti’s greatest writers, fifteen years younger that Roumain himself. Jacques Stephen Alexis, who would go on to pen such pivotal Haitian works as Compère Général Soleil and L’espace d’un cillement, made his first appearance in Haiti’s politician conscience during this time, a political commitment which would result in his murder by Duvalierist henchmen after an ill-fated attempt to invade Haiti with some like-minded compatriots in 1961. [4]

Duvalier himself flits in and out of the story of the years before his ascendancy, helping to gradually hone the idea of négritude into noirisme, which the Communists and Marxists, many of them of more comfortable backgrounds than those of the noiristes themselves, viewed as little more than a cover by which the black middle class could seize power. After the fall of Lescot, the two sides stood with daggers drawn, the noiristes depicting Haiti’s radical left as bourgeois usurpers and the left depicting the noiristes as reactionary demagogues with fascist tendencies. And watching all, the Haitian military, personified by the slippery soldier-politician Paul Magloire, serving many Haitian presidents but beholden to none of them.

In my own book, Notes from the Last Testament: The Struggle for Haiti, I argued that much of modern Haitian political history began with Dumarsais Estimé, who stepped into the political maelstrom described above and served as Haiti’s president from August 1946 until May 1950.5 Estimé has indeed been, as Smith writes, “one of the most misunderstood heads of state in Haitian history” (110), despite featuring quite prominently in Island Possessed, the autobiography of the American dancer Katherine Dunham, who lived in Haiti and was Estimé’s lover for a time, and being touched on, glancingly, in a number other histories of Haiti.

Born in Verettes in the Artibonite Valley, Estimé was a former schoolteacher who had risen up the ladder of Haiti’s political establishment to serve in the Chamber of Deputies and, eventually, in the Vincent government. When voted by Haiti’s parliament to become the country’s new president, he was the first black president of post-occupation Haiti. Though not exactly a noiriste himself, Estimé drew his political base from the country’s disenfranchised black majority and sought to ameliorate the suffering by raising Haiti’s minimum wage, by expanding schools and social services, and by creating a series of public-works projects for the chronically unemployed Haitian labor force. Existing as he did outside of Haiti’s traditional political structures, though—representing the black underclass without being a noiriste, speaking for the disenfranchised while shunning the radical left, at odds with the military and the country’s economic elite—Estimé could never have expected an easy ride while in office and indeed did not get one.

“Progressive Haitians expected a revolution with Estimé,” Smith writes. “What they got was a period of unsustainable hope rife with color resentment, ideological polarization and a bitter, occasionally violent struggle for political power among forces inside and outside the government."

With members of the black intelligentsia filling virtually every cabinet post in his government, and with his deep understanding of the struggles of the country’s long-disenfranchised peasant majority, Estimé provided a brief tenure that in retrospect represents a far more genuine attempt by Haiti’s often-cannibalistic political system to come to terms with the needs of its citizens than the far-more-heralded, corrupted, violent, and compromised dual truncated terms of Jean-Bertrand Aristide decades later.

Indeed, the chief flaw of Smith’s book is perhaps that it too intensely focuses on the political machinations in Haiti’s capital, largely ignoring its vast countryside, where armed opposition to the US occupation in the forms of rebellions led by Charlemagne Peralte and Benoit Batraville was strongest, and where the independence of peasants remains a thorn in the side of the capital’s political class to this day. The great untold story of the last decades in Haiti is of the country’s peasantry and the way their lives have continued in recent decades—despite the political battles raging in the capital, despite the failed SHADA program, despite a disastrous program in the early 1980s, funded by the United States and Canada, that succeeded in destroying the 1.2 million Kreyol pigs, and despite the Aristide government’s duplicitous 1995 decision to cut tariffs on rice imports to the country from 35 percent to 3 percent. Largely abandoned by all but a handful of grassroots peasant organizations such as the Mouvman Peyizan Nasyonal Kongrè Papay and Tèt Kole Ti Peyizan, the Haitian peasantry have somehow, against all odds, managed to survive.

Estimé’s attempts to reassert Haiti’s control over its own economy in the face of US economic interests met with a predictably vitriolic response at a time when Washington seemed unable to differentiate any labor or social movement from one that was Communist or Communist-inspired, a particular irony in Haiti, since Estimé would go so far as to outlaw the PCH in 1948.

Representative though it was, Estimé’s government also proved short-sighted on some key matters. Gestures such as the nationalization of Haiti’s banana industry in 1947, while appealing on an emotional level, were so badly managed that United Fruit, the company that had dominated Haiti’s banana industry prior to that time, was back at the helm by 1949, with Haitian banana shipments being used to pay off the massive debt accrued over the two years of state control. Estimé also had the questionable claim to fame of bringing to the center of political power for the first time the particular political skills of François Duvalier, then a young official from Port-au-Prince politician Daniel Fignolé’s Mouvement des ouvriers et paysans (MOP). Duvalier served as Estimé’s director of public health, and continued on in the government after Fignolé, his ostensible boss, resigned.

We see under Estimé, as under Duvalier and Aristide years later, the emergence and gradual expansion of a nouveau riche black political and economic class that benefited from what had often been the prerogative of the traditional elite: political nepotism and corruption. It was a slow transformation and opening of what continues to be a broken political system, but it nevertheless allowed the country’s black majority, in very rare instances, to take a few steps toward access to greater political and economic influence in Haiti, even though those left outside, that is, the majority of Haitians who remained both black and poor, continued to be as disenfranchised as ever. These complex intersections of class and race and political and economic power are among the areas that most often trip up novice commentators on Haiti and it is refreshing to see Smith spend some time examining them.

We now know that the political fortunes of Estimé, like those of his chief rival Fignolé, were doomed amid the splintering of the diverse coalition that helped oust Lescot in 1946, a disintegration in which we find precursors of the violent fraying the occurred after the toppling of the Duvalier dictatorship four decades later. As relations between Estimé and Fignolé turned poisonous, the radical Left, never taken in by appeals to race-based politics, remained deeply hostile to the Estimé government.

As was their wont, the Americans mistook Fignolé’s fiery oratory for that of a communist and were fearful of the MOP’s considerable organizational capacity. Hand in hand with oppressing the MOP, Estimé in turn outlawed the PCH in 1948 and attempted to institute constitutional revisions that would allow him to succeed himself as president in the summer of 1949, provoking a violent student and labor strike the likes of which had helped topple Lescot and would help topple the second Aristide government in 2003/2004. Following Estimé’s ouster by the army the following year, Paul Magloire, the more-or-less unchallenged head of Haiti’s military, ruled from December 1950 until December 1956. This ushered in a period that observers sometimes nostalgically reminisce as a “golden age” for Haiti, a characterization that overlooks the deep sense of bitterness and betrayal that Estimé’s supporters nursed as the country was ruled by a military dictatorship viewed by many as little more than a tool of the elite. Magloire was quite willing to use violence to crush dissidents, particularly among the left and the press and, far from creating a sense of détente between Haiti’s competing political factions, tensions between them continued to fester, culminating, after Magloire’s ouster, with the assumption of the presidency by François Duvalier in October 1957 after a violence-wracked ballot. Smith’s book leaves us on the cusp of the advent of one of the most brutal dictatorships the Americas have ever seen, but, as Smith demonstrates, François Duvalier did not arise out of a vacuum; he was indeed molded and shaped by the political jockeying the occurred after the United States departed in 1934.

III

I write these lines almost two months to the day after an massive earthquake devastated Port-au-Prince and its environs and left untold tens of thousands dead in its wake. Haiti’s Palais National, which so many successive leaders have struggled to control, lies in ruins, as does the Cathédrale Sainte Trinité, while the Palais Législatif is badly damaged. It is an event that may ultimately prove nearly as pivotal, in its own way, as the overthrow of the French in 1804 in that it has laid bare many of the brutal inequalities and contradictions in Haitian society as never before (as well as the international community’s relationship with the country) and completely reordered the balance of power in what is now a truly stricken land. Haiti’s political class, whose previous battles Smith has detailed so masterfully in his book, has never appeared more unable to meet the needs of its people, even the most basic need of personal physical security. As I traveled throughout the stricken capital and to the countryside in the days after the earthquake, the call I heard again and again from people in markets, in tap- taps, and in tent camps was for a US military coordination of relief efforts in the country, a call that would doubtless stun and sadden the nationalists, were they still alive, that Smith writes about in a book. It is a melancholy statement on how far the Haitian people’s faith in their political class has fallen.

The dysfunctional nature of Haiti’s politics cannot be blamed on a single source; it is rather the product of decades of political and economic miscalculation and ill intention on the part of both Haiti’s leaders and the international community. Because far too much commentary on Haiti at present emanates from the voices of poorly informed ideologues, with little back- ground in Haiti’s tortured political history and even less understanding of and respect for its often politically-charged cultural and artistic traditions, books such as Smith’s Red and Black in Haiti will provide an invaluable sense of historical perspective as foreigners with an interest in helping Haitians on their road to building a responsive, human state wonder how best to aid the country. It is time to disregard forever the ahistorical, irresponsible approach with which foreigners so often approach Haiti, and time for them to try to solemnly educate themselves about its history before presuming to lecture the Haitians themselves on what they should do. Red and Black in Haiti is an invaluable contribution to that end.


Miami, March 2010



1 Matthew J. Smith, Red and Black in Haiti: Radicalism, Conflict, and Political Change, 1934–1957 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). Hereafter cited in the text.

2 For further thoughts on this phenomenon, see Michael Deibert, “Thoughts on Recent Haiti Commentaries,” Michael Deibert’s Blog, 9 February 2010, http:// michaeldeibert.blogspot.com/2010/02/thoughts-on-recent-haiti-commentaries.html.

3 Robert Debs Heinl and Nancy Gordon Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492–1995 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996), 313.

4 Despite not focusing exclusively on the topic, Alexis’s 1955 novel, Compère Général Soleil (Paris: Gallimard, 1955) translated into English by Carrol F. Coates as General Sun, My Brother (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1999), still contains what is perhaps the most scathing and accurate depiction of Haiti’s political class that has been written to date.

5 Michael Deibert, Notes from the Last Testament: The Struggle for Haiti (New York: Seven Stories, 2005).



Michael Deibert is a journalist, author, and visiting fellow at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry University. His writing has appeared in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Guardian, the Miami Herald, Le Monde diplomatique, and Folha de São Paulo, among other publications. In his role at Coventry University, he aids the center in its mission to increase and sustain dialogue on international peacebuliding and development issues, with a particular focus on Africa and Latin America. He is the author of Notes from the Last Testament: The Struggle for Haiti (2005).

Sunday, December 4, 2011

Sonia Pierre 1963-2011




Sonia Pierre, you were the greatest patriot that the Dominican Republic could ask for, one of the greatest advocates for human rights in the Americas and a hero to us all. Your work and your example live on. Domi byen, fanm vanyan.

Friday, November 4, 2011

Lyonel Trouillot, écrivain de la colère

Littérature

Lyonel Trouillot, écrivain de la colère

04/11/2011 à 19h:54

Par Tshitenge Lubabu M.K.

Jeune Afrique

(Read the original article here)

Les lecteurs de l’écrivain haïtien Lyonel Trouillot ont cru jusqu’au bout que le Goncourt 2011 allait lui être décerné. Tel n’a pas été le cas. Mais sa sélection a permis d’attirer l’attention sur son œuvre dont l’engagement est le credo inaliénable.

« On fait tous de la surenchère. Quel que soit le pays, il y a toujours un écart entre le jour de la fête nationale et le reste de l’année, entre les discours officiels et le parler tremblé de la vie quotidienne, entre les cartes postales et les vies de chien du commun des mortels. Ne viens pas me raconter que chez toi tout est beau. Que tous y sont heureux ». Cette citation tirée de La Belle amour humaine, le dernier roman de Lyonel Trouillot qui lui a valu d’être, jusqu’au 2 novembre, sur la liste des quatre finalistes du prix Goncourt, semble à elle seule résumer la fougue de son auteur qui s'y trouve tout entier. Homme en colère, qui n’accepte ni l’indifférence des siens face à la paupérisation du plus grand nombre, ni l’arrogance de ceux qui, parce que nantis ou se croyant tels, s'autoproclament conscience du monde, prompts à juger sans apporter de solution à l’égoïsme humain, à l’exploitation de l’homme par son semblable et à la déliquescence du monde qui les entoure.

Le 31 décembre, Lyonel Trouillot aura 55 ans. Sa carrière littéraire, dont la première œuvre a été publiée en 1979, compte à ce jour dix-sept titres, allant de la poésie au roman. Sa particularité : il écrit aussi bien en français qu’en créole haïtien. Dès le départ, il a choisi sa voie sans la moindre équivoque : l’engagement, c’est-à-dire la dénonciation des laideurs de son île, de son peuple, dont l’histoire est à la fois grandiose et triste. C’est à Haïti, nul ne peut l'oublier, que, pour la première fois dans l’Histoire de l’humanité, un peuple d’esclaves a vaincu l’armée du maître et arraché son indépendance. Mais la geste grandiose de Toussaint Louverture se transformera, pendant deux siècles, en tragédie-comédie.

"Écrire avec Haïti"

Balloté entre oppression interne, occupation et ingérence extérieures, Haïti n’a cessé de souffrir dans sa chair. Pour Trouillot, point n’est besoin de réécrire l’Histoire. Il faut l’assumer. Combattre, surtout, pour l’avènement d’un pays plus juste, plus fraternel, plus humain, plus solidaire. Il n’est point question, affirme-t-il, « d’écrire sur Haïti, mais avec Haïti, un pays qui se débat pour produire une belle histoire alors qu’il est du côté le plus sombre de l’Histoire ».

Pourtant, Trouillot n’est pas ce qu’on peut appeler un fils du peuple. Un père professeur de droit et bâtonnier à Port-au-Prince, plutôt bien vu du régime de François Duvalier. Une mère infirmière. En 1970, un an avant la mort de Duvalier, Trouillot se retrouve aux États-Unis, principale terre d’exil de milliers de ses compatriotes. Il revient néanmoins sur son île cinq ans plus tard. Objectif : jouer un rôle actif afin de contribuer à la chute du régime de Duvalier fils, alias Bébé Doc.

S’il étudie le droit, tradition familiale oblige, il se plonge dans la littérature. Il lit, certes, mais il écrit surtout des poèmes dans lequel il distille toute la subversion qui l’anime. Il le jure : « Il n’y a d’écriture que politique ». En 1980-1982, Trouillot se retrouve à Miami. Mais il ne tarde pas à regagner Haïti. Pour lui, être sur le terrain est fondamental. Et depuis, il ne cesse de se battre - en s'engageant par exemple dans le Collectif NON, qui réclame le départ de Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Dans sa quête d'homme et d'écrivain, maniant une écriture dense et poétique, il se révèle comme un véritable maître de la parole dont l’ambition, la seule, est de rendre la complexité de son île. Une île qui doit tendre les bras à l’espoir.