This thought-provoking and analytically impressive commentary was published on the blog of Figaro Joseph, author of The Power of Movement in Political Transitions: Haiti Under the Lavalas. Well worth a read.
Thursday, December 2, 2010
Wednesday, December 1, 2010
Thoughts on Haiti’s elections
My most recent thoughts on Haiti's elections can be read at my other blog here.
United States Embassy Cable: Deconstructing Préval
O 161802Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0044
INFO HAITI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MONTREAL PRIORITY
AMCONSUL QUEBEC PRIORITY
DEA HQS WASHDC PRIORITY
HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT AU PRINCE 000575
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS USAID FOR LAC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV HA KBIO
SUBJECT: DECONSTRUCTING PREVAL
Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson, reason 1.4(b) and (d).
(Originally posted here)
Summary and Introduction
-------------------------
¶1. (C) Haitian President Rene Preval has now completed three
years of his five year presidential mandate. Widely touted as
the "transitional president" poised to lead Haiti into a new
era of democracy and economic prosperity, he has had only
modest success thus far. Haiti's problems are indeed
daunting, and redressing them will take much more than a
five-year term. However, Preval's particular world view, his
personality and often indecisive and uncommunicative
leadership style, coupled with Haiti's deeply divided
political class and the devastating events of 2008, have
conspired to defer, if not derail, forward movement here.
¶2. (C) That being said, Preval remains Haiti's indispensable
man. Legitimately elected, still moderately popular, and
likely the only politician capable of imposing his will on
Haiti - if so inclined - Preval's role over the next 18
months is critical. Dealing with Preval is a challenge,
occasionally frustrating and sometimes rewarding. He is wary
of change and suspicious of outsiders, even those who seek
his success. Managing Preval will remain challenging during
the remainder of his term yet doing so is key to our success
and that of Haiti. We must continue to find creative ways to
work with him, influence him, and encourage him to recapture
the activism of his first year in office. Until he does,
political change and economic progress, so necessary to
Haiti's future, is likely to be incremental at best.
The Politics of Personality
----------------------------
¶3. (C) Preval's attitude towards his presidency has been
shaped by both experience and personality. As Aristide's
Prime Minister and successor, he was overshadowed by the more
charismatic ex-priest. At our first meeting, Preval recounted
that he was "the last stop after Tabarre (where Aristide
lived) when visitors came", bitterly reminding me that many
USG visitors barely had time to see him when he was
president. Those slights still rankle. A retiring, complex
personality, the president shares little. His inner circle
has greatly constricted during the past two years, with key
advisors including Bob Manuel, all but dropping out. His
involvement with his fiancee, financial advisor Babette
Delatour has colored many of his other relationships,
according to friends, and caused an estrangement of sorts
with his sister and one of his daughters.
¶4. (C) Even those close to Preval concede that his
chameleon-like character makes dealing with the president
difficult. One close advisor calls it "the roller coaster
that is Rene Preval." Personally engaging - even seductive -
when he so wishes, Preval can be equally harsh with
colleagues and others. Ministers, close advisors and others
have felt the sting of his tongue, both in public and in
private. Stubbornly holding to ideas long past their shelf
life, he rarely welcomes dissenting opinions. His courting
of Taiwan in 2006, which almost led to the Chinese blocking
renewal of the MINUSTAH mandate in 2006, is a case in point.
Preval is highly disinclined to delegate power or authority
and even the smallest detail comes to his office for
decision, a situation which has caused stress in his
relationships with both his current and former prime
ministers. Planning Minister Bellerive described to me a
recent Cabinet meeting where the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet presented a development plan for the long-suffering
northern tier of the country. Preval ridiculed the idea and
when confronted by a united ministerial front, walked out of
the cabinet meeting and told his advisors to strike the
proposal from the agenda.
¶5. (C) Uncomfortable in formal settings such as summits and
international conferences, Preval seeks personal
"relationships of trust" with his interlocutors. Often
unable to articulate exactly what he wants - except in the
broadest of terms - Preval tends to view issues in black and
white. Nonetheless, he expects a positive - and prompt
response. That is particularly true of his dealings with the
international community. He remains skeptical about the
international community's commitment to his government's
goals, for instance telling me that he is suspicious of how
the Collier report will be used. He measures success with the
international community - and the U.S.- in terms of positive
response to his priorities, rather than according to some
broader international benchmarks of success.
¶6. (C) Nevertheless, Preval's stubborn and cautious nature
has sometimes borne fruit. In his first year in office, he
was widely praised for reaching out to Haitians of all
political stripes and for attempting to bridge Haiti's
massive political divides. He has shrewdly coopted major
political rivals into his personal cabinet over the past two
years and has, through patient diplomacy managed to get
fractious parliamentary groupings to sit around the table
working on issues ranging from the budget to privatization to
the current minimum wage crisis. He believes strongly that
without his intercession, the international community would
have ignored the impact of the 2008 hurricanes on Haiti, and
that his early efforts at negotiation and discussion with the
gangs of Cite Soleil (which he often reminds me that I
criticized at the time) set the stage for the successful
MINUSTAH operation to clear the area.
A Narrowing Circle?
------------------
¶7. (C) Preval's seeming isolation in the palace during the
past year is striking. Close friends report that they have
little contact - and even less influence - with him. A
businessman who was key to Preval's election said the last
time that he talked to Preval, the president brushed him off.
Shunning newspapers and radio, he has a friend in New York do
a daily press summary for him; otherwise he freely admits
that he neither reads nor listens to the news, either local
or international. He uses one or two cell phones but rarely
shares the numbers with his colleagues. He uses his email to
communicate with family and close friends, but prefers to
talk on the telephone. He seldom leaves the palace except to
travel to his residence each evening and to the retreat he
has bought for his fiancee in the mountains above Port au
Prince.
The Health Issue
----------------
¶8. (C) Preval's occasionally erratic behavior over the past
year has again sparked widespread rumors that he is suffering
from the effects of his past prostate cancer or that he has
resumed drinking. There is no indication that he is taking
medicine that affects his judgment or temperament, but he has
ignored suggestions from his inner circle, including that of
Delatour, that he do complete medical check-up in the U.S. He
has not been to Cuba for follow-up tests in more than a year.
Preval has increased his alcoholic consumption and often
attends a Petionville night club with friends, but during our
social interaction I have never seen him drink to excess.
Nonetheless, reports of heavy drinking are circulating
widely.
An Agenda deferred: Elections, Constitutional Reform, and
Drugs
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶9. (C) Preval has said that his agenda for his remaining
years in office focuses on three interconnected issues:
elections, constitutional reform, and drugs. He came late to
the election issue, originally suggesting that the partial
Senatorial elections be combined with the lower house polls
scheduled for fall. He backed down in the face of
international pressure, but also as he came to realize that
he would have little success - or support - if he moved on
constitutional reform without a fully functioning senate.
Given the delays in moving this election forward, he no
longer believes that he will see an overhaul of the
constitution. He now expects to focus on two critical
constitutional issues, dual nationality and government
decentralization. He has angrily denied charges that he
manipulated the electoral process through the CEP and its
decision to exclude Lavalas to undermine an already weak
legislature.
¶10. (C) Preval's focus on comprehensive constitutional reform
over the past year raised concerns about his ulterior
motives. Many in Haiti's political class drew the conclusion
that Preval was seeking a third term. The President's
refusal to explicitly reject that possibility created
confusion and uncertainty, but I view this development as
highly unlikely. Nonetheless, concerns about Preval's
intentions, coupled with deteriorating relations with
parliament, and his cavalier treatment of major political
parties has undermined consensus on constitutional reform and
he seems now resigned to more limited changes.
¶11. (C) Preval's fixation on drug trafficking reflects both a
growing frustration with the inflow of drugs into the
country's political process and irritation that his
government is unable to address something that could indeed
pose a personal threat to his future after the presidency.
Shunning all GOH responsibility for the problem, he looks to
hand it over to us. He has yet to believe that we take his
concerns seriously, and that has colored much of his dealings
with us beyond the counternarcotics agenda.
A not-always-helpful world view
-------------------------------
¶12. (C) Although Preval's presidency started off well, with
the new president reaching out across the political spectrum
in an effort to create a new political culture in the
country, those efforts have now essentially stalled. The
President, whether by inclination or design, has not fully
developed a vision of Haiti's future. By turns determined or
distracted, Preval is often reluctant to use the levers of
power given to him by the office of the presidency. In one
telling instance, he held off going public in the April riots
until the presidency appeared to hang in the balance.
Skeptical of friends from abroad, and cynical about his own
political class's ability to effect change, Preval believes
that it is best only to speak out after the deals are done.
Pressing him to be more expansive and communicative has been,
in my experience, counterproductive. At the same time, he is
reluctant to let anyone else pick up the slack, and as a
result, the political vacuum in Haiti is often filled by
those who do not necessarily have the nation's best interests
at heart.
¶13. (C) There are those who argue that the April, 2008 riots
so badly shook Preval's world view that he has become
reluctant to act. We believe this is too simplistic an
explanation. Preval was indeed unprepared for the riots in
the street, but he used them to press some key objectives,
including the removal of then-Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard
Alexis. More to the point, I believe that the President's own
style and outlook, his often unilateral decision-making
style, his propensity to micromanage, and his essentially
cynical (and often justified) view of the Haitian political
process were, I believe, reinforced by what he saw in April,
and he is looking for ways to ensure he is not caught
unawares again.
¶14. (C) Preval's old friends suggest that in many ways he
remains the radical student who broke with his conservative
father and spent his university days in the political
maelstrom of 1960s Europe. While this may overstate the
case, Preval remains essentially a nationalist politician in
the Haitian sense of the word - suspicious of outsiders
intentions and convinced that no one understands Haiti like
he does. He often takes actions, such as publicly dismissing
the results of the Washington Donors Conference or stalling
elections, which could be construed as working at cross
purposes with the U.S. Preval clearly believes that he can
walk a fine line without losing U.S. or international
community support. Here, however, he runs a risk. Although he
briefly lived in the U.S., Preval does not truly understand
Americans or the Washington policy environment - and he often
ignores advisors who do.
The After-Life
--------------
¶15. (C) Close friends speculate that many of Preval's actions
during the past year - his rapprochement with Alexis and the
Neptune faction of Lavalas, his obsession with constitutional
reform, his anger over drug trafficker Guy Philippe, even his
reactions to the April riots - stem from his very real fear
that politics will prohibit him from returning to private
life in Haiti after his presidency. Thus, they argue, his
overriding goal is to orchestrate the 2011 presidential
transition in such a way as to ensure that whoever is elected
will allow him to go home unimpeded. Based on our
conversations, this is indeed a matter that looms large for
Preval. He has said to me on various occasions that he is
worried about his life after the presidency, that he would
not survive in exile. His concerns seem real, given Haiti's
history, albeit somewhat overblown at this point in time.
What It Means for Us
---------------------
¶16. (C) Preval and I entered on duty in our respective
positions at pretty much the same time and we have enjoyed an
interesting, if not always harmonious, relationship during
the past three and a half years. During that period, I have
found him somewhat isolated, less open to ideas and advice,
and more reluctant to use the tools of his office to advance
his agenda than in his first year in office. Some say that
he is reverting to the do-nothing persona of his first term
as president. Like much about Preval, the reality is somewhat
more complicated. What is clear to me, however, is that
Preval has yet to truly provide the strong, consistent
leadership that Haiti's current circumstances demand. In
other places, we could find ways to circumvent or overcome
these weaknesses. Not so in Haiti. Given Haiti's strong
tradition of presidential rule, the blurred constitutional
lines of authority, and his own reluctance to delegate
authority, I believe that Preval - and only Preval - will
continue to set the rhythm and scope of change in Haiti. And
while we may argue with him about pace and priorities, we
will have to adapt to his rhythm. Dealing with Preval has
never been easy. Yet he remains Haiti's indispensable man and
he must succeed in passing this country to a new leadership
in 2011. We therefore must continue to find creative,
consistent ways to reinforce and maintain our engagement - at
all levels of the USG - with Preval and to press him to move
forward the important agenda of change that remains as yet
unrealized here.
TIGHE
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0044
INFO HAITI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MONTREAL PRIORITY
AMCONSUL QUEBEC PRIORITY
DEA HQS WASHDC PRIORITY
HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT AU PRINCE 000575
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS USAID FOR LAC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV HA KBIO
SUBJECT: DECONSTRUCTING PREVAL
Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson, reason 1.4(b) and (d).
(Originally posted here)
Summary and Introduction
-------------------------
¶1. (C) Haitian President Rene Preval has now completed three
years of his five year presidential mandate. Widely touted as
the "transitional president" poised to lead Haiti into a new
era of democracy and economic prosperity, he has had only
modest success thus far. Haiti's problems are indeed
daunting, and redressing them will take much more than a
five-year term. However, Preval's particular world view, his
personality and often indecisive and uncommunicative
leadership style, coupled with Haiti's deeply divided
political class and the devastating events of 2008, have
conspired to defer, if not derail, forward movement here.
¶2. (C) That being said, Preval remains Haiti's indispensable
man. Legitimately elected, still moderately popular, and
likely the only politician capable of imposing his will on
Haiti - if so inclined - Preval's role over the next 18
months is critical. Dealing with Preval is a challenge,
occasionally frustrating and sometimes rewarding. He is wary
of change and suspicious of outsiders, even those who seek
his success. Managing Preval will remain challenging during
the remainder of his term yet doing so is key to our success
and that of Haiti. We must continue to find creative ways to
work with him, influence him, and encourage him to recapture
the activism of his first year in office. Until he does,
political change and economic progress, so necessary to
Haiti's future, is likely to be incremental at best.
The Politics of Personality
----------------------------
¶3. (C) Preval's attitude towards his presidency has been
shaped by both experience and personality. As Aristide's
Prime Minister and successor, he was overshadowed by the more
charismatic ex-priest. At our first meeting, Preval recounted
that he was "the last stop after Tabarre (where Aristide
lived) when visitors came", bitterly reminding me that many
USG visitors barely had time to see him when he was
president. Those slights still rankle. A retiring, complex
personality, the president shares little. His inner circle
has greatly constricted during the past two years, with key
advisors including Bob Manuel, all but dropping out. His
involvement with his fiancee, financial advisor Babette
Delatour has colored many of his other relationships,
according to friends, and caused an estrangement of sorts
with his sister and one of his daughters.
¶4. (C) Even those close to Preval concede that his
chameleon-like character makes dealing with the president
difficult. One close advisor calls it "the roller coaster
that is Rene Preval." Personally engaging - even seductive -
when he so wishes, Preval can be equally harsh with
colleagues and others. Ministers, close advisors and others
have felt the sting of his tongue, both in public and in
private. Stubbornly holding to ideas long past their shelf
life, he rarely welcomes dissenting opinions. His courting
of Taiwan in 2006, which almost led to the Chinese blocking
renewal of the MINUSTAH mandate in 2006, is a case in point.
Preval is highly disinclined to delegate power or authority
and even the smallest detail comes to his office for
decision, a situation which has caused stress in his
relationships with both his current and former prime
ministers. Planning Minister Bellerive described to me a
recent Cabinet meeting where the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet presented a development plan for the long-suffering
northern tier of the country. Preval ridiculed the idea and
when confronted by a united ministerial front, walked out of
the cabinet meeting and told his advisors to strike the
proposal from the agenda.
¶5. (C) Uncomfortable in formal settings such as summits and
international conferences, Preval seeks personal
"relationships of trust" with his interlocutors. Often
unable to articulate exactly what he wants - except in the
broadest of terms - Preval tends to view issues in black and
white. Nonetheless, he expects a positive - and prompt
response. That is particularly true of his dealings with the
international community. He remains skeptical about the
international community's commitment to his government's
goals, for instance telling me that he is suspicious of how
the Collier report will be used. He measures success with the
international community - and the U.S.- in terms of positive
response to his priorities, rather than according to some
broader international benchmarks of success.
¶6. (C) Nevertheless, Preval's stubborn and cautious nature
has sometimes borne fruit. In his first year in office, he
was widely praised for reaching out to Haitians of all
political stripes and for attempting to bridge Haiti's
massive political divides. He has shrewdly coopted major
political rivals into his personal cabinet over the past two
years and has, through patient diplomacy managed to get
fractious parliamentary groupings to sit around the table
working on issues ranging from the budget to privatization to
the current minimum wage crisis. He believes strongly that
without his intercession, the international community would
have ignored the impact of the 2008 hurricanes on Haiti, and
that his early efforts at negotiation and discussion with the
gangs of Cite Soleil (which he often reminds me that I
criticized at the time) set the stage for the successful
MINUSTAH operation to clear the area.
A Narrowing Circle?
------------------
¶7. (C) Preval's seeming isolation in the palace during the
past year is striking. Close friends report that they have
little contact - and even less influence - with him. A
businessman who was key to Preval's election said the last
time that he talked to Preval, the president brushed him off.
Shunning newspapers and radio, he has a friend in New York do
a daily press summary for him; otherwise he freely admits
that he neither reads nor listens to the news, either local
or international. He uses one or two cell phones but rarely
shares the numbers with his colleagues. He uses his email to
communicate with family and close friends, but prefers to
talk on the telephone. He seldom leaves the palace except to
travel to his residence each evening and to the retreat he
has bought for his fiancee in the mountains above Port au
Prince.
The Health Issue
----------------
¶8. (C) Preval's occasionally erratic behavior over the past
year has again sparked widespread rumors that he is suffering
from the effects of his past prostate cancer or that he has
resumed drinking. There is no indication that he is taking
medicine that affects his judgment or temperament, but he has
ignored suggestions from his inner circle, including that of
Delatour, that he do complete medical check-up in the U.S. He
has not been to Cuba for follow-up tests in more than a year.
Preval has increased his alcoholic consumption and often
attends a Petionville night club with friends, but during our
social interaction I have never seen him drink to excess.
Nonetheless, reports of heavy drinking are circulating
widely.
An Agenda deferred: Elections, Constitutional Reform, and
Drugs
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶9. (C) Preval has said that his agenda for his remaining
years in office focuses on three interconnected issues:
elections, constitutional reform, and drugs. He came late to
the election issue, originally suggesting that the partial
Senatorial elections be combined with the lower house polls
scheduled for fall. He backed down in the face of
international pressure, but also as he came to realize that
he would have little success - or support - if he moved on
constitutional reform without a fully functioning senate.
Given the delays in moving this election forward, he no
longer believes that he will see an overhaul of the
constitution. He now expects to focus on two critical
constitutional issues, dual nationality and government
decentralization. He has angrily denied charges that he
manipulated the electoral process through the CEP and its
decision to exclude Lavalas to undermine an already weak
legislature.
¶10. (C) Preval's focus on comprehensive constitutional reform
over the past year raised concerns about his ulterior
motives. Many in Haiti's political class drew the conclusion
that Preval was seeking a third term. The President's
refusal to explicitly reject that possibility created
confusion and uncertainty, but I view this development as
highly unlikely. Nonetheless, concerns about Preval's
intentions, coupled with deteriorating relations with
parliament, and his cavalier treatment of major political
parties has undermined consensus on constitutional reform and
he seems now resigned to more limited changes.
¶11. (C) Preval's fixation on drug trafficking reflects both a
growing frustration with the inflow of drugs into the
country's political process and irritation that his
government is unable to address something that could indeed
pose a personal threat to his future after the presidency.
Shunning all GOH responsibility for the problem, he looks to
hand it over to us. He has yet to believe that we take his
concerns seriously, and that has colored much of his dealings
with us beyond the counternarcotics agenda.
A not-always-helpful world view
-------------------------------
¶12. (C) Although Preval's presidency started off well, with
the new president reaching out across the political spectrum
in an effort to create a new political culture in the
country, those efforts have now essentially stalled. The
President, whether by inclination or design, has not fully
developed a vision of Haiti's future. By turns determined or
distracted, Preval is often reluctant to use the levers of
power given to him by the office of the presidency. In one
telling instance, he held off going public in the April riots
until the presidency appeared to hang in the balance.
Skeptical of friends from abroad, and cynical about his own
political class's ability to effect change, Preval believes
that it is best only to speak out after the deals are done.
Pressing him to be more expansive and communicative has been,
in my experience, counterproductive. At the same time, he is
reluctant to let anyone else pick up the slack, and as a
result, the political vacuum in Haiti is often filled by
those who do not necessarily have the nation's best interests
at heart.
¶13. (C) There are those who argue that the April, 2008 riots
so badly shook Preval's world view that he has become
reluctant to act. We believe this is too simplistic an
explanation. Preval was indeed unprepared for the riots in
the street, but he used them to press some key objectives,
including the removal of then-Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard
Alexis. More to the point, I believe that the President's own
style and outlook, his often unilateral decision-making
style, his propensity to micromanage, and his essentially
cynical (and often justified) view of the Haitian political
process were, I believe, reinforced by what he saw in April,
and he is looking for ways to ensure he is not caught
unawares again.
¶14. (C) Preval's old friends suggest that in many ways he
remains the radical student who broke with his conservative
father and spent his university days in the political
maelstrom of 1960s Europe. While this may overstate the
case, Preval remains essentially a nationalist politician in
the Haitian sense of the word - suspicious of outsiders
intentions and convinced that no one understands Haiti like
he does. He often takes actions, such as publicly dismissing
the results of the Washington Donors Conference or stalling
elections, which could be construed as working at cross
purposes with the U.S. Preval clearly believes that he can
walk a fine line without losing U.S. or international
community support. Here, however, he runs a risk. Although he
briefly lived in the U.S., Preval does not truly understand
Americans or the Washington policy environment - and he often
ignores advisors who do.
The After-Life
--------------
¶15. (C) Close friends speculate that many of Preval's actions
during the past year - his rapprochement with Alexis and the
Neptune faction of Lavalas, his obsession with constitutional
reform, his anger over drug trafficker Guy Philippe, even his
reactions to the April riots - stem from his very real fear
that politics will prohibit him from returning to private
life in Haiti after his presidency. Thus, they argue, his
overriding goal is to orchestrate the 2011 presidential
transition in such a way as to ensure that whoever is elected
will allow him to go home unimpeded. Based on our
conversations, this is indeed a matter that looms large for
Preval. He has said to me on various occasions that he is
worried about his life after the presidency, that he would
not survive in exile. His concerns seem real, given Haiti's
history, albeit somewhat overblown at this point in time.
What It Means for Us
---------------------
¶16. (C) Preval and I entered on duty in our respective
positions at pretty much the same time and we have enjoyed an
interesting, if not always harmonious, relationship during
the past three and a half years. During that period, I have
found him somewhat isolated, less open to ideas and advice,
and more reluctant to use the tools of his office to advance
his agenda than in his first year in office. Some say that
he is reverting to the do-nothing persona of his first term
as president. Like much about Preval, the reality is somewhat
more complicated. What is clear to me, however, is that
Preval has yet to truly provide the strong, consistent
leadership that Haiti's current circumstances demand. In
other places, we could find ways to circumvent or overcome
these weaknesses. Not so in Haiti. Given Haiti's strong
tradition of presidential rule, the blurred constitutional
lines of authority, and his own reluctance to delegate
authority, I believe that Preval - and only Preval - will
continue to set the rhythm and scope of change in Haiti. And
while we may argue with him about pace and priorities, we
will have to adapt to his rhythm. Dealing with Preval has
never been easy. Yet he remains Haiti's indispensable man and
he must succeed in passing this country to a new leadership
in 2011. We therefore must continue to find creative,
consistent ways to reinforce and maintain our engagement - at
all levels of the USG - with Preval and to press him to move
forward the important agenda of change that remains as yet
unrealized here.
TIGHE
Sunday, November 28, 2010
Des organisations nationales d’observation craignent la pagaille et des possibilités de fraudes massives
Des organisations nationales d’observation craignent la pagaille et des possibilités de fraudes massives
samedi 27 novembre 2010
Communiqué
Soumis à AlterPresse le 26 novembre 2010
(Read the original article here)
Les organisations signataires de la présente, engagées dans l’observation électorale, s’empressent de porter à la connaissance de l’opinion publique, leurs inquiétudes relatives à la délocalisation massive des électeurs, opérée par le Conseil Electoral, par rapport aux centres de vote où ceux-ci avaient voté par le passé.
En effet, à la suite d’une enquête préliminaire effectuée sur un échantillon d’électeurs, les organisations ont constaté que le CEP a décidé de déplacer bon nombre d’électeurs et de les forcer à remplir leur devoir civique dans des centres éloignés du lieu de leur résidence.
Les organisations signataires de la présente rappellent qu’elles avaient déjà dénoncé cette campagne des COV, Centres d’Opération et de Vérification, qui ne se justifiaient nullement, état donné que plus de 90 % des personnes déplacées après le séisme du 12 janvier 2010 se trouvent à proximité de leur lieu de résidence d’avant le séisme.
Il devient donc clair que la finalité de la création des COV consistait à éloigner les potentiels votants de leurs centres de vote habituels ce, dans le but de créer la pagaille, l’énervement et le découragement des électeurs, au jour du scrutin. Ainsi, le CEP se croira alors autorisé à permettre aux citoyens de remplir leur devoir civique dans n’importe quel bureau de vote. Ce qui est parfaitement illégal et de nature à faciliter une fraude massive.
Si ces observations préliminaires se confirment, deux possibilités sont à envisager :
1. un grand nombre de citoyens risquent de ne pas pouvoir voter ;
2. le vote risque d’être livré sans contrôle du numéro de Carte d’Identification Nationale (CIN) sur la liste électorale.
Ces problèmes dans le processus électoral sont exacerbés par le fait que les numéros de téléphone communiqués par le CEP pour permettre aux électeurs d’identifier l’adresse de leur bureau de vote sont quasiment dysfonctionnels.
Les organisations signataires alertent les candidats, les partis politiques, la Nation toute entière et l’opinion internationale sur ces anomalies qui sont de nature à engendrer des fraudes massives, à invalider les élections et à plonger le pays dans une crise aux conséquences imprévisibles.
Pour les Organisations :
Conseil National d’Observation des Elections (CNO) : Nael Laguerre
Initiative de la Société Civile (ISC) : Rosny Desroches
Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH) : Pierre Espérance
Centre d’Education, des Recherches et d’action en Sciences Sociales et pénales (CERESS) Woldson Bertrand
Conseil Haïtien des Acteurs Non Etatiques (CONHANE) : Edouard Paultre
Mouvman Fanm Actif Kafou (MOFKA) Magdala Jn Pierre
samedi 27 novembre 2010
Communiqué
Soumis à AlterPresse le 26 novembre 2010
(Read the original article here)
Les organisations signataires de la présente, engagées dans l’observation électorale, s’empressent de porter à la connaissance de l’opinion publique, leurs inquiétudes relatives à la délocalisation massive des électeurs, opérée par le Conseil Electoral, par rapport aux centres de vote où ceux-ci avaient voté par le passé.
En effet, à la suite d’une enquête préliminaire effectuée sur un échantillon d’électeurs, les organisations ont constaté que le CEP a décidé de déplacer bon nombre d’électeurs et de les forcer à remplir leur devoir civique dans des centres éloignés du lieu de leur résidence.
Les organisations signataires de la présente rappellent qu’elles avaient déjà dénoncé cette campagne des COV, Centres d’Opération et de Vérification, qui ne se justifiaient nullement, état donné que plus de 90 % des personnes déplacées après le séisme du 12 janvier 2010 se trouvent à proximité de leur lieu de résidence d’avant le séisme.
Il devient donc clair que la finalité de la création des COV consistait à éloigner les potentiels votants de leurs centres de vote habituels ce, dans le but de créer la pagaille, l’énervement et le découragement des électeurs, au jour du scrutin. Ainsi, le CEP se croira alors autorisé à permettre aux citoyens de remplir leur devoir civique dans n’importe quel bureau de vote. Ce qui est parfaitement illégal et de nature à faciliter une fraude massive.
Si ces observations préliminaires se confirment, deux possibilités sont à envisager :
1. un grand nombre de citoyens risquent de ne pas pouvoir voter ;
2. le vote risque d’être livré sans contrôle du numéro de Carte d’Identification Nationale (CIN) sur la liste électorale.
Ces problèmes dans le processus électoral sont exacerbés par le fait que les numéros de téléphone communiqués par le CEP pour permettre aux électeurs d’identifier l’adresse de leur bureau de vote sont quasiment dysfonctionnels.
Les organisations signataires alertent les candidats, les partis politiques, la Nation toute entière et l’opinion internationale sur ces anomalies qui sont de nature à engendrer des fraudes massives, à invalider les élections et à plonger le pays dans une crise aux conséquences imprévisibles.
Pour les Organisations :
Conseil National d’Observation des Elections (CNO) : Nael Laguerre
Initiative de la Société Civile (ISC) : Rosny Desroches
Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH) : Pierre Espérance
Centre d’Education, des Recherches et d’action en Sciences Sociales et pénales (CERESS) Woldson Bertrand
Conseil Haïtien des Acteurs Non Etatiques (CONHANE) : Edouard Paultre
Mouvman Fanm Actif Kafou (MOFKA) Magdala Jn Pierre
Friday, November 26, 2010
HAITI: A Talk By International Correspondent and Author Michael Deibert
HAITI: A Talk By International Correspondent and Author Michael Deibert
CARIBBEAN ARTS GALLERY
720 Franklin Avenue
New Orleans, LA 70117
7:30 pm
Thursday, December 2, 2010
In the wake of this Sunday's presidential elections in Haiti, CARIBBEAN ARTS LTD. will host a talk entitled: “HAITI: The Long View” by distinguished international reporter MICHAEL DEIBERT, at the gallery, 720 Franklin Ave., New Orleans, at 7:30 p.m. on THURSDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2010.
Mr. Deibert was the on-the-ground correspondent for Reuters during the tumultuous last years of Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s presidency; more recently flew to Port-au-Prince a few days after the January 12th earthquake to report on the situation in the wake of the catastrophe. He is the author of the book, Notes from the Last Testament: The Struggle for Haiti. In his talk, Mr. Deibert will address “the long-term issues Haitians face in their battle to survive,” while making reference to “the historical and cultural connections between New Orleans and Haiti.”
Admission to the event is free and open to the public. For further information, contact David Baron at (504) 943-3858 / (917) 330-4446, or e-mail caribartlover@yahoo. com
BIOGRAPHY OF MICHAEL DEIBERT
Michael Deibert is a journalist, author and Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry University. His writing on Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe has appeared in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Guardian, Folha de Sao Paulo, Le Monde diplomatique and the Miami Herald, among other publications. In 2008, he was selected as a finalist for the Kurt Schork Award in International Journalism, sponsored by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, for his reporting from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
A featured commentator on international affairs on the BBC, Channel 4, Al Jazeera, National Public Radio, and WNYC New York Public Radio, Mr. Deibert sparked a lifelong interest in Haiti with a visit there in 1997, and subsequently served as the Reuters correspondent in the country. Mr. Deibert's Notes from the Last Testament: The Struggle for Haiti praised by the Miami Herald as "a powerfully documented exposé" and by the San Antonio Express-News as "a compelling mix of reportage, memoir and social criticism." He recently completed a novel set in France and West Africa. His blog can be read at www.michaeldeibert.blogspot.com.
CARIBBEAN ARTS GALLERY
720 Franklin Avenue
New Orleans, LA 70117
7:30 pm
Thursday, December 2, 2010
In the wake of this Sunday's presidential elections in Haiti, CARIBBEAN ARTS LTD. will host a talk entitled: “HAITI: The Long View” by distinguished international reporter MICHAEL DEIBERT, at the gallery, 720 Franklin Ave., New Orleans, at 7:30 p.m. on THURSDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2010.
Mr. Deibert was the on-the-ground correspondent for Reuters during the tumultuous last years of Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s presidency; more recently flew to Port-au-Prince a few days after the January 12th earthquake to report on the situation in the wake of the catastrophe. He is the author of the book, Notes from the Last Testament: The Struggle for Haiti. In his talk, Mr. Deibert will address “the long-term issues Haitians face in their battle to survive,” while making reference to “the historical and cultural connections between New Orleans and Haiti.”
Admission to the event is free and open to the public. For further information, contact David Baron at (504) 943-3858 / (917) 330-4446, or e-mail caribartlover@yahoo. com
BIOGRAPHY OF MICHAEL DEIBERT
Michael Deibert is a journalist, author and Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry University. His writing on Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe has appeared in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Guardian, Folha de Sao Paulo, Le Monde diplomatique and the Miami Herald, among other publications. In 2008, he was selected as a finalist for the Kurt Schork Award in International Journalism, sponsored by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, for his reporting from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
A featured commentator on international affairs on the BBC, Channel 4, Al Jazeera, National Public Radio, and WNYC New York Public Radio, Mr. Deibert sparked a lifelong interest in Haiti with a visit there in 1997, and subsequently served as the Reuters correspondent in the country. Mr. Deibert's Notes from the Last Testament: The Struggle for Haiti praised by the Miami Herald as "a powerfully documented exposé" and by the San Antonio Express-News as "a compelling mix of reportage, memoir and social criticism." He recently completed a novel set in France and West Africa. His blog can be read at www.michaeldeibert.blogspot.com.
Wednesday, November 17, 2010
Cholera Epidemic: The Haitian Government must determine MINUSTAH’s responsibility
Cholera Epidemic: The Haitian Government must determine MINUSTAH’s responsibility
Press release from Haiti's Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains
The National Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RNDDH) is deeply alarmed by the epidemic of cholera which, during the second half of October 2010 hit the country, particularly the departments of Artibonite and Centre.
Official figures show that as of November 2nd, 2010, there are more than three hundred thirty-seven (337) reported deceased against the four thousand seven hundred twenty-two (4722) presenting with symptoms of the disease.
While these figures are alarming, RNDDH however encourages the continued efforts by state authorities and international agencies working in the field of health, to reduce the number of deaths, to treat people already infected with cholera and prevent the spread of the disease.
If the source of cholera is not yet known, RNDDH feels obliged to share with national and international community, its’ misgivings about the involvement of the United Nations Mission for Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in the transmission of this disease.
Indeed, according to information gathered on the ground by RNDDH and one of its departmental structures, the Central Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RECENDH) Nepalese soldiers, assigned to the MINUSTAH base at Mirebalais, dug two (2) pits, connected by pipes made of polyvinyl chloride (also known as PVC), which has allowed them to dump the waste water and fecal material into the Boukan Kanni and Jenba rivers near Meille, thereby degrading and polluting the environment of the country. Consequently, a foul smell emanates from these rivers, and many users claim to suffer from vaginal infections, rashes and skin diseases such as eczema. Moreover, these rivers are tributaries of the Artibonite River that carries water to its mouth in Grande Saline.
RNDDH recalls that the MINUSTAH base in Mirebalais is responsible for the collapse of the Latèm bridge in 2008. Indeed, the base is located on the floodplain of the Boukan Kanni river, large shipping containers were placed by officers to prevent any risk of flooding during the torrential rains that battered the region on the 8th to the 9th of September 2008. These containers directly caused the washout and collapse of the bridge.
RNDDH believes that if the cholera is a disease caused by poor hygiene, the contamination of the Boukan Kanni, Jenba and consequently, the Artibonite rivers, may have contributed to its spread in the Central and Artibonite departments.
RNDDH finds it inconceivable that MINUSTAH soldiers are involved in the pollution of rivers and the further degradation of Haiti’s environment, already shattered by the rampant cutting of trees, anarchic construction of buildings and blocked waterways.
Faced with this epidemic that is sweeping the country, RNDDH recommends that the authorities concerned:
Port-au-Prince, November 3rd 2010
NOTE: This document has been translated from the original version published in French.
Press release from Haiti's Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains
The National Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RNDDH) is deeply alarmed by the epidemic of cholera which, during the second half of October 2010 hit the country, particularly the departments of Artibonite and Centre.
Official figures show that as of November 2nd, 2010, there are more than three hundred thirty-seven (337) reported deceased against the four thousand seven hundred twenty-two (4722) presenting with symptoms of the disease.
While these figures are alarming, RNDDH however encourages the continued efforts by state authorities and international agencies working in the field of health, to reduce the number of deaths, to treat people already infected with cholera and prevent the spread of the disease.
If the source of cholera is not yet known, RNDDH feels obliged to share with national and international community, its’ misgivings about the involvement of the United Nations Mission for Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in the transmission of this disease.
Indeed, according to information gathered on the ground by RNDDH and one of its departmental structures, the Central Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RECENDH) Nepalese soldiers, assigned to the MINUSTAH base at Mirebalais, dug two (2) pits, connected by pipes made of polyvinyl chloride (also known as PVC), which has allowed them to dump the waste water and fecal material into the Boukan Kanni and Jenba rivers near Meille, thereby degrading and polluting the environment of the country. Consequently, a foul smell emanates from these rivers, and many users claim to suffer from vaginal infections, rashes and skin diseases such as eczema. Moreover, these rivers are tributaries of the Artibonite River that carries water to its mouth in Grande Saline.
RNDDH recalls that the MINUSTAH base in Mirebalais is responsible for the collapse of the Latèm bridge in 2008. Indeed, the base is located on the floodplain of the Boukan Kanni river, large shipping containers were placed by officers to prevent any risk of flooding during the torrential rains that battered the region on the 8th to the 9th of September 2008. These containers directly caused the washout and collapse of the bridge.
RNDDH believes that if the cholera is a disease caused by poor hygiene, the contamination of the Boukan Kanni, Jenba and consequently, the Artibonite rivers, may have contributed to its spread in the Central and Artibonite departments.
RNDDH finds it inconceivable that MINUSTAH soldiers are involved in the pollution of rivers and the further degradation of Haiti’s environment, already shattered by the rampant cutting of trees, anarchic construction of buildings and blocked waterways.
Faced with this epidemic that is sweeping the country, RNDDH recommends that the authorities concerned:
• Make an independent investigation to determine, if any, responsibility for
MINUSTAH in the spread of this disease;
• Educate staff of MINUSTAH on environmental protection;
• Take all appropriate measures to prevent the spread of the disease in
areas not yet affected, and particularly in highly concentrated areas.
MINUSTAH in the spread of this disease;
• Educate staff of MINUSTAH on environmental protection;
• Take all appropriate measures to prevent the spread of the disease in
areas not yet affected, and particularly in highly concentrated areas.
Port-au-Prince, November 3rd 2010
NOTE: This document has been translated from the original version published in French.
Saturday, November 6, 2010
Pour une campagne électorale axée sur la lutte anti-corruption
Date: Le 3 novembre 2010
Contact médias : Marilyn B. Allien
Téléphone: (509) 2513-7089 / 2257-7956
Courriel: heritagehaiti@yahoo.com / admlfhh@yahoo.com
Pour une campagne électorale axée sur la lutte anti-corruption
Pétion-Ville, Haïti, le 3 novembre 2010 – Le 28 novembre prochain, des centaines d'Haïtiens brigueront les suffrages de la population dans l'espoir de la représenter à l'Assemblée nationale et à la tête de l'Etat et d’accéder ainsi aux plus hautes fonctions au sein de la République d'Haïti. Poursuivant son combat résolu contre la fraude et la corruption, La Fondation Héritage pour Haïti (LFHH), section haïtienne de Transparency International (TI), lance un pressant appel à tous les candidats aux prochaines élections présidentielles et législatives afin qu'ils démontrent clairement leur intention et leur ferme volonté d'enrayer ces fléaux, devenus les préoccupations majeures de la population haïtienne en cette période pré-électorale.
Par conséquent, LFHH invite chaque candidat, sans distinction aucune, à mener une campagne électorale dont l'objectif serait, avant tout, de diffuser et d'expliquer son programme politique et d’éviter tout dérapage qui ne pourrait que desservir sa cause personnelle et celui de l'intérêt national.
LFHH invite chacun des candidats à:
Reconnaître qu'il ne peut y avoir de vraie démocratie sans liberté d'information et que la corruption se nourrit du silence, de l'opacité, et prospère de la démobilisation ou de la mise à l'écart des citoyennes et des citoyens;
Déclarer publiquement et volontairement ses avoirs personnels avant le jour des élections afin de souligner son désir d'œuvrer avant tout pour l'intérêt commun et de démontrer sa crédibilité;
Indiquer clairement, dans son programme ou à travers celui de son parti, comment il compte, s'il est élu, mener à bien, et dans les plus brefs délais, le combat contre la fraude et la corruption à tous les niveaux et dans tous les secteurs du pays;
Faire preuve d'une totale transparence tout au long de la campagne électorale en s'abstenant de toute pratique frauduleuse qui pourrait influencer indûment des électeurs dans l'exercice de leur droit de vote.
LFHH demande, de plus, à chaque candidat de s'engager, en cas d’élection:
A répondre avec diligence à toute demande émanant de citoyens, relative à l’exécution de ses fonctions ou au fonctionnement des services dont il aurait la responsabilité;
A encourager et à développer toute mesure qui favoriserait la transparence du fonctionnement des institutions dont il aurait la responsabilité;
A empêcher tout recrutement fondé sur des principes autres que la reconnaissance des mérites et des compétences professionnelles et/ou à des fins autres que les besoins de l’institution.
En cas d'intérêts personnels directs ou indirects dans les dossiers faisant l’objet d’un examen par les instances où il pourrait siéger, à déclarer ces intérêts avant la délibération et le vote;
A assortir toute décision de sa part d’une motivation circonstanciée reprenant l’ensemble des éléments ayant fondé sa décision, tout en démontrant la conformité de cette décision par rapport à la loi;
A démontrer, en l’absence de réglementation, sa motivation conforme à l’intérêt général ; et
A ne prendre aucune mesure lui accordant un avantage personnel professionnel futur, après la cessation de ses fonctions, au sein d’entités publiques ou privées qui étaient sous son contrôle, avec lesquelles il a noué des relations contractuelles, ou qui ont été créées pendant l’exercice de ses fonctions précédentes.
Contact médias : Marilyn B. Allien
Téléphone: (509) 2513-7089 / 2257-7956
Courriel: heritagehaiti@yahoo.com / admlfhh@yahoo.com
Pour une campagne électorale axée sur la lutte anti-corruption
Pétion-Ville, Haïti, le 3 novembre 2010 – Le 28 novembre prochain, des centaines d'Haïtiens brigueront les suffrages de la population dans l'espoir de la représenter à l'Assemblée nationale et à la tête de l'Etat et d’accéder ainsi aux plus hautes fonctions au sein de la République d'Haïti. Poursuivant son combat résolu contre la fraude et la corruption, La Fondation Héritage pour Haïti (LFHH), section haïtienne de Transparency International (TI), lance un pressant appel à tous les candidats aux prochaines élections présidentielles et législatives afin qu'ils démontrent clairement leur intention et leur ferme volonté d'enrayer ces fléaux, devenus les préoccupations majeures de la population haïtienne en cette période pré-électorale.
Par conséquent, LFHH invite chaque candidat, sans distinction aucune, à mener une campagne électorale dont l'objectif serait, avant tout, de diffuser et d'expliquer son programme politique et d’éviter tout dérapage qui ne pourrait que desservir sa cause personnelle et celui de l'intérêt national.
LFHH invite chacun des candidats à:
Reconnaître qu'il ne peut y avoir de vraie démocratie sans liberté d'information et que la corruption se nourrit du silence, de l'opacité, et prospère de la démobilisation ou de la mise à l'écart des citoyennes et des citoyens;
Déclarer publiquement et volontairement ses avoirs personnels avant le jour des élections afin de souligner son désir d'œuvrer avant tout pour l'intérêt commun et de démontrer sa crédibilité;
Indiquer clairement, dans son programme ou à travers celui de son parti, comment il compte, s'il est élu, mener à bien, et dans les plus brefs délais, le combat contre la fraude et la corruption à tous les niveaux et dans tous les secteurs du pays;
Faire preuve d'une totale transparence tout au long de la campagne électorale en s'abstenant de toute pratique frauduleuse qui pourrait influencer indûment des électeurs dans l'exercice de leur droit de vote.
LFHH demande, de plus, à chaque candidat de s'engager, en cas d’élection:
A répondre avec diligence à toute demande émanant de citoyens, relative à l’exécution de ses fonctions ou au fonctionnement des services dont il aurait la responsabilité;
A encourager et à développer toute mesure qui favoriserait la transparence du fonctionnement des institutions dont il aurait la responsabilité;
A empêcher tout recrutement fondé sur des principes autres que la reconnaissance des mérites et des compétences professionnelles et/ou à des fins autres que les besoins de l’institution.
En cas d'intérêts personnels directs ou indirects dans les dossiers faisant l’objet d’un examen par les instances où il pourrait siéger, à déclarer ces intérêts avant la délibération et le vote;
A assortir toute décision de sa part d’une motivation circonstanciée reprenant l’ensemble des éléments ayant fondé sa décision, tout en démontrant la conformité de cette décision par rapport à la loi;
A démontrer, en l’absence de réglementation, sa motivation conforme à l’intérêt général ; et
A ne prendre aucune mesure lui accordant un avantage personnel professionnel futur, après la cessation de ses fonctions, au sein d’entités publiques ou privées qui étaient sous son contrôle, avec lesquelles il a noué des relations contractuelles, ou qui ont été créées pendant l’exercice de ses fonctions précédentes.
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